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Abstract 
We look at the effects of rainfall forecasts and realized rainfall on equilibrium agricultural wages 
over the course of the agricultural production cycle. We show theoretically that a forecast of 
good weather can lower wages in the planting stage, by lowering ex ante out-migration, and can 
exacerbate the negative impact of adverse weather on harvest-stage wages. Using Indian 
household panel data describing early-season migration and district-level planting- and harvest-
stage wages over the period 2005-2010, we find results consistent with the model, indicating that 
rainfall forecasts improve labor allocations on average but exacerbate wage volatility because 
they are imperfect. 
 
* The authors thank Nirav Shah for excellent research assistance, and Seema Jayachandran for comments. 
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In (Rosenzweig and Udry 2013) we showed that investments by Indian farmers in the 
July -August planting stage were significantly affected by the long-range kharif-season monsoon 
rainfall forecast issued by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) in late June. We also 
found that the profitability of those investments were highly sensitive to the realization of rainfall 
over the season, so that the forecasts enhanced average profits but contributed to profit volatility. 
In this article we examine the effects of the forecast and rainfall on planting- and harvest-stage 
agricultural wage rates. Prior research on the effects of rainfall on agricultural wage rates (e.g. 
Jayachdran, 2006; Kaur, 20012) have examined the effects of rainfall on seasonal average wages 
without attention to the timing of investment and labor-supply/migration decisions within the 
season. This neglect is potentially important, as wages in the planting stage are relatively 
unaffected by rainfall, but may be affected by rainfall forecasts, and the effects of rainfall 
realizations on harvest-stage wage rates may be affected by whether or not the rainfall forecast 
predicted good or bad weather for the season. 
To analyze the interactions between rainfall forecasts and weather realizations on wages 
over the crop-cycle we first construct a simple general-equilibrium model of the agricultural 
labor market which is attentive to the sequential nature of agricultural production. In the first 
period prior to the full realization of rainfall, farmers choose agricultural inputs based on a 
forecast of subsequent rainfall while landless households decide whether to remain in the village 
or to out-migrate. We thus focus on the ex ante migration decision, in contrast to the prior 
literature that has examined ex post labor supply (Kochar, 1997) and ex post migration responses 
to rainfall shocks (Morten, 2013). In the second period of the model, the rainfall shock is realized 
and farmers profit-maximize, hiring the labor that has remained in the village given their sunk 
planting-stage investments. The model indicates that a positive rainfall forecast has an 
ambiguous effect on planting-stage wages, depending on the strengths of investment and 
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migration responses, but can have a negative effect on harvest-stage wages if realized rainfall is 
low. 
Based on the model, we estimate the effects of the IMD forecast on planting-stage 
migration decisions using household panel data and the effects of the forecast and rainfall 
realizations on planting- and harvest-stage wages using Indian district-level data on activity- and 
month-specific wages and district-level monthly rainfall data covering the period 2005-2010. In 
putting these data together, we uncover some of the pitfalls of using existing district-level wage 
and rainfall data. The estimates indicate that a forecast of above-average rainfall leads to reduced 
village out-migration, especially by men, and to a small but statistically significant overall 
decline in planting-stage wages. The positive forecast, as indicated by the model, also 
exacerbates the negative impact of adverse weather on harvest-stage wages. Thus, rainfall 
forecasts appear to improve the allocation of labor across space when they are correct but also 
increase inter-annual wage volatility as a result of being imperfect. We also show that the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), introduced in a limited set of districts in 
2007 and then in all districts by 2010, helps moderate this volatility.  
I. Rural Labor Markets with Forecasting 
In this section we provide  a simple model of rural labor markets when informative 
forecasts of seasonal weather are available. Consider a set of identical farmers. Farm output is 
0 1( , ),sh x x where x0 is the quantity of planting stage labor, x1 is the quantity of harvest-stage labor 
and { , }s g b∈  is the weather realization. Planting-stage labor is chosen before s is realized; 
harvest-stage labor after. We abstract from other inputs (and suppress the land input, since it is 
identical across farmers). Assume that 0 1 0 1( , ) ( , )b gh x x h x x<  and 
0 10 1 ( , )( , ) gb
t t
h x xh x x
x x
∂∂
<
∂ ∂
 for 
{0,1}t∈ . In addition, we assume that planting- and harvest-stage labor are complements and that 
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this complementarity increases is good weather
2 2
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1
( , ) ( , ) 0.g b
h x x h x x
x x x x
∂ ∂
> >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 A forecast
{ , }F G B∈  is released before x0 is chosen. Farmers have access to savings/credit markets, but we 
assume that there is no insurance available.  After the forecast is made, farmers choose labor 
inputs (x0, x1g, x1b) and saving/borrowing (a) to maximize 
(1) 0 1 1( ) ( | ) ( ) (1 ( | )) ( ).b gu c prob b F u c prob b F u c+ + −   
Conditional on the forecast, the farmer’s budget constraints are 
(2) 0 0 0( )c Y w F x a= − −   
(3) 1 0 1 1 1( , ) ( ) ,s s sc h x x w F x ra= − +   
where we have made the possible dependence of wages on the forecast explicit. Both output and 
consumption are valued at price 1. 
If state s is realized in period 1 after a forecast of F in period zero we have separability in the 
choice of 1x  which can be summarized by  
(4) 
1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1( , , ( )) arg max ( , ) ( ) .s s s
x
x x s w F h x x w F x≡ −  
The concavity of (.)sh  implies that 1 0 1( , , )sx x s w  is decreasing in w1s. 1 0 1 0( , , ) ( , , )x x g w x x b w>
because the marginal product of harvest labor is higher in good weather. Complementarity 
between planting- and harvest-stage labor implies 1 0 1 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , ), , { , }.
h l h lx x s w x x s w x x s g b> ∀ > ∈  
We have a mass 1 of identical farmers demanding labor, so the aggregate demand for harvest-
stage labor in the village is simply 1 0 1( , , ( )).sx x s w F  Turning to the planting-stage, Rosenzweig 
and Udry (2013) show that 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1(G, , , ) (B, , , ).g b g bx w w w x w w w>  x0 is strictly declining in each 
of the three wages. Farmers are identical, so aggregate planting-stage labor demand is simply 
0 0 1 1( , , , ).g bx F w w w   
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Labor is supplied by a mass 1 of landless laborers. After the forecast, the landless choose 
to migrate out of the village or not ( {0,1}m∈ ). If they choose to migrate, they earn the wage at 
the place to which they migrate in both the planting and the harvest-stage; if they choose not to 
migrate they supply 1 unit of labor to the village labor market. Landless choose m to maximize 
(1) subject to 
(5) 0 0(1 ) ( )mc Y mw m w F a= + + − −   
(6) 1 1(1 ) ( )s m sc mw m w F ra= + − +   
where mw  is the net wage from migration, which is known and the same in period 0 and any state 
of period 1. The landless have a distribution of net wages from migration given by ( ).mH w   
There is a critical 0 1 1( , , , )m g bw F w w w= Ω such that all landless with mmw w≥ migrate and 
all others do not (in parallel to the cultivators, we are assuming that all landless have the same Y, 
so we suppress the dependence of mw  on Y). Ω is increasing in each of the wages. If in 
equilibrium 1 1g bw w> then 0 1 1 0 1 1( , , , ) ( , , , ),g b g bG w w w B w w wΩ > Ω because of the higher probability 
of good weather occurring conditional on a forecast of good weather. Labor supply in the 
planting-stage and in the good and bad states of the harvest-stage is identical and equal to
( ).mH w   
The equilibrium set of wages 0 1 1( ) { ( ), ( ), ( )}g bF w F w F w F=w satisfies  
(7) 
0
1 0 1
1 0 1
( ( , ( )) ( , ( ))
( ( , ( )) ( , , ( ))
( ( , ( )) ( , , ( ))
g
b
H F F x F F
H F F x x g w F
H F F x x b w F
Ω =
Ω =
Ω =
w w
w
w
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Equilibrium harvest-stage wages are always higher in good than bad weather: for { , },F G B∈
1 1( ) ( ).g bw F w F>  The complementarity between planting- and harvest-stage (which is stronger in 
better weather) ensures that 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).g b g bw G w G w B w B− > −   
The effect of the forecast on planting- and harvest-stage wages can be ambiguous 
because of the potential migration response to a good vs. bad forecast. The reservation migration 
wage increases with a forecast of good weather, because the local harvest-stage wage is higher in 
good weather.  Suppose that there is a small migration response to this change in the reservation 
wage: ( ( , ( ))) ( ( , ( ))).H B B H G BΩ ≈ Ωw w Then, because 0 0( , ) (B, )x G x>w w  and 1 0 1( , , )sx x s w  is 
increasing in x0, equilibrium wages are higher with a forecast of good weather.  But the reverse 
can be true if the migration response to the forecast is sufficiently strong. 
           The public works opportunities provided by NREGA are modelled as a wage floor.  The 
most interesting case is when equilibrium wages have the following pattern in the absence of 
NREGA: 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )g bw F w F w F> > . Now suppose NREGA introduces a wage floor ( ).w  Our 
model implies that the effect of increasing w depends on when this floor binds.  If it binds only in 
the harvest-stage if the rainfall is poor, then, since out-migration declines as w  increases and 
planting-stage labor demand declines with harvest-stage wages, both the planting-stage wage and 
the harvest-stage wage if there is good rainfall decline as NREGA comes into effect. In contrast, 
if w is greater than the planting-stage wage, then the planting-stage wage increases with NREGA.  
In our empirical work, we examine four facets of this model.  First, we examine the 
migration response during the planting-stage to the IMD forecast.  Second, we quantify the 
equilibrium response of district-level planting-stage wages to the forecast. Third, we ask if the 
effect of rainfall shocks on district-level harvest-stage wages varies according to the forecast. In 
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particular, is the negative effect of a bad rainfall shock particularly severe after a forecast of a 
good monsoon? Finally, we look at the effect of NREGA on planting- and harvest-stage wages. 
II. Data 
Analyzing stage-specific responses to forecasts and rainfall realizations requires data that 
provide information by either agricultural production stages or by month. In Rosenzweig and 
Udry (2013) we used the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Village 
Level Survey Data (ICRISAT VLS), which provides high frequency information on agricultural 
inputs by date and operation for six villages over the period 2005-2011. These data also provide 
information on the out-migration of household members included in the survey. For the purposes 
here of studying ex ante out-migration, we focus on out-migration between July 1 and August 15 
- after the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) June forecast but prior to the full realization 
of rainfall. Unfortunately, the surveyors did not adhere to the monthly survey design in 2007 and 
2008, so we have five years of migration information for the six villages. Out-migration in the 
early months of the kharif (June-October) season is non-trivial for prime-age males. As seen in 
the top panel of Table 1, almost 16% of males age 15-39 migrated in July-August. Female ex 
ante migration is one-third that of male migration. The sample we use for the analysis of 
migration includes all household members who participated in the labor market during the kharif 
season. Because of the different migration rates of men and women, we also analyze the 
determinants of migration separately by gender. 
For the empirical analysis of agricultural wage rates we also need wage rates by 
operational stage. The Directorate of Economics and Statistics within the Indian Ministry of 
Agriculture provides district-level daily agricultural wages by month, “activity,” and gender. 
Three activities are relevant to our analysis - “sower” and “ploughman” for the planting stage 
and “reaper and harvester” for the harvest stage. Our criteria for choosing wages was to select 
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male wages for sowers and ploughman in the month of June and July and male harvesters for 
September and October for the years 2005-2010. Unfortunately, many of the districts had 
missing information for these month and activity classifications. To maximize sample size, we 
constructed June/July planting-stage wages by first selecting ploughmen wages in those months, 
then if this category was missing selecting the wage rates of sowers and then if this category was 
missing for the relevant months we used the wages for “other agricultural labor.” The majority of 
wages for the planting-stage were for ploughmen. For the September/October harvest period, we 
selected harvester/reaper wages as a priority and then the wages for other agricultural operations 
in those months if wages were missing for that activity.1 All wages are deflated by the CPI for 
agricultural workers, using 2005 as the base year. 
The standard rainfall data set for monthly Indian district-level rainfall is the Terrestrial 
Air Temperature and Precipitation compiled by Cort J. Wilmott and Kenji Matsuura, which 
covers the period 1950-2010. While rainfall is provided for a 0.5 by 0.5 degree grid of points 
across India, which can be matched to the centroid of each of over 600 Indian districts, the 
source of the rainfall information comes from only 81 weather stations maintained by the 
National Center for Atmospheric research (NCAR). The district-level rainfall data is thus 
spatially interpolated. This interpolation introduces noise. To minimize the effects of 
measurement error, we initially selected districts that were within 100 miles of the NCAR 
weather stations (65 districts). However, because of the problem of missing wage information, to 
increase the number of districts we added additional districts. The final data sets for analysis 
1Jayachrandran (2006) and Kauer (2012) used the district-level male agricultural wage series assembled by Robert 
E. Evenson and James W. McKinsey, Jr. from the same monthly wage data we use, and available in the World Bank 
India Agricultural and Climate data. This series does not distinguish wages by stage of operation, providing only one 
average wage observation per year that weights the months of June and August more heavily and also selects 
ploughman as a priority activity. Because June operations and ploughing in particular cannot be affected by rainfall 
over the full agricultural season, this wage series will be less sensitive to weather realizations than will a wage series 
focusing on the harvest stage. In our analyses of planting-stage and harvest-stage wage rates we included dummy 
variables indicating activity-type for the relevant months. These were not statistically significant. 
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consisted of 106 districts and 387 observations for planting-stage wages and 95 districts and 337 
observations for harvest-stage wages. 
  Using the rainfall data, we constructed for each district and year the ratio of actual 
rainfall in the July-September period over its 60-year historic mean. We classify a bad rainfall 
shock as one in which this measure is below one. We also appended to each observation the June 
area- and year-specific IMD forecast and created a dummy variable for each district/year 
indicating whether or not NREGA had been implemented in the district.  
The bottom panel of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these data. As can be seen, 
the average distance of an NCAR weather station to a district is over 82 miles. As a 
consequence, in our wage specifications we examine whether the estimated rainfall shock effect 
on harvest wages is attenuated by weather station distance. A key point of our analysis is that the 
determinants of planting- and harvest-stage wages are not the same. In our data sets, while the 
average levels of the harvest and planting-stage wages are similar, they display distinctly 
different variability across years. This is indicated in Figure 1, which plots the ratio of harvest to 
planting-stage wages by year for the districts and years in which both stage-specific wages are 
available. 
III. Results 
Table 2 reports village fixed-effect estimates of the effect of the IMD long-range forecast 
on planting-season migration in the ICRISAT VLS survey. In column one, the point estimate 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in forecasted rain leads to a 0.7 percentage point 
reduction in migration, from a base level of 9 percent of the population.2  Columns 2 and 3 
provide estimates by gender.  The responsiveness of migration to the forecast is stronger for men 
than fpr women.  A one standard deviation increase in forecasted rain leads to a decline of 1.1 
2 The effect of forecasted rain on migration is robust to controls for realized rainfall over the entire monsoon, or for 
realized rain in June and July (not shown). 
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percentage points in male seasonal migration (from a base of 16 percent).  Female seasonal 
migration is insensitive to forecasted rain.  Female seasonal migration is also not associated with 
age, and female migration declines with education, in contrast to the pattern observed for men. 
In Table 3 we examine the relationships between the IMD forecast and realized rainfall 
for equilibrium planting- and harvest-stage agricultural wages using the district-level data. The 
district fixed effect estimates indicate that there is a small, but precisely-determined decline in 
the planting-stage wage with increases in forecasted rainfall.  A one standard deviation increase 
in forecasted rainfall leads to a 2 percent decline in the planting-stage wage. This is consistent 
with the migration response to forecasted rain that we observe in Table 2.   
The planting-stage wage also increases with rainfall shocks.  A one standard deviation 
increase in rainfall above the long-term average increases planting-stage wages by 5.6 percent.  
However, this relationship declines in the distance between the district centroid and the nearest 
NCAR weather station.  The point estimates indicate that there is no correlation between the 
rainfall shock and planting-stage wages for a district 100 miles from the nearest station.  The 
estimates also indicate that the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
increased planting-stage wages by about 9.6 percent.  Thus the NREGA wage is sufficiently high 
that it binds in the planting-stage.  
The model suggests that harvest-stage wages are differentially sensitive to the IMD 
forecast, depending upon realized rainfall.  This is shown in column 2 of Table 3.  On average, 
harvest-stage wages move little with the IMD forecast, which is consistent with the migration 
response to the forecast seen in Table 2.  However, increases in forecasted rainfall lead to 
declines in the harvest-stage wage if a bad rainfall shock is realized.  This effect occurs both 
because the forecast of more rainfall increases labor supply by reducing seasonal migration away 
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from the village, and because the bad rainfall shock reduces harvest-stage labor demand by 
cultivators.   
As we observed with planting-stage wages, the estimated relationship between rainfall shocks 
and harvest-stage wages declines with the distance between the district and the nearest NCAR 
rainfall station.  Implementation of NREGA is also associated with increases in harvest-stage 
wages, particularly in years with bad rainfall shocks, as expected. 
IV. Conclusion 
Informative rainfall forecasts permit welfare-improving anticipatory migration. This 
complements the finding of Rosenzweig and Udry (2013) that forecasts improve average profits 
of cultivators. The supply of and the demand for stage-specific agricultural labor depend on 
forecasts of seasonal rainfall.  As a consequence, equilibrium stage-specific wages for 
agricultural labor are sensitive to these forecasts. The response of harvest-stage wages to 
forecasted rainfall, however, varies depending upon realized rainfall for the season. The 
availability of rainfall forecasts creates a new risk for the landless, even if they have rainfall 
insurance.3  A forecast of good rainfall (which reduces out-migration of labor from the village) 
followed by a realization of adverse weather generates a sharper drop in the harvest-stage wage 
than would be realized were no forecast available.  Hence even if perfect (basis-risk free) 
weather index insurance existed, there would still be a missing market for forecast insurance.  
Our results indicate that NGEGA, in part, fills this function by raising harvest-stage wages 
particularly in bad weather states. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, by Data Set 
Variable Mean SD 
ICRISAT VLS India, 2005-2011 
Planting-stage migration rate, males 15-39 .157 .364 
Planting-stage migration rate, females 15-39 .0467 .211 
Age 33.3 18.8 
Schooling (years) 5.37 4.46 
Forecast 96.5 2.36 
District Male Agricultural Daily Wages, 2005-2010 
Planting-stage wage (2005 Rs.) 71.6 32.2 
Harvest-stage wage (2005 Rs.) 73.0 29.4 
Rainfall shock (relative to 60-year mean) 1.04 .293 
Bad rainfall shock (below mean) .347 .477 
Distance from nearest NCAR weather station (miles) 82.1 59.7 
Forecast 95.1 4.12 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in place .615 .487 
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Table 2 
Village Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Determinants of Planting-Stage Out-Migration 
(ICRISAT VLS India: 2005-2011) 
Variable All Workers Males Females 
Forecast -.00293 
(2.69) 
 -.00485  
(2.68) 
-.000332 
(0.33) 
Age .000853 
(1.32) 
.00141 
(1.32) 
-.000195 
(0.32) 
Age squared -.0000194 
(2.38) 
-.0000314 
(2.28) 
-.0000683 
(0.91) 
Schooling .00711 
(10.0) 
.0118 
(10.9) 
-.00184 
(2.47) 
Male .0557 
(9.58) 
- - 
N 6,501 3,507 2,994 
Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses. 
Table 3 
Village Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Determinants of Male Daily Wages, 
by Stage of Operation (Agricultural Wages of India, 2005-2010) 
Variable Log Planting-Stage Wage Log Harvest-Stage Wage 
Rainfall shock .192 
(3.09) 
.056 
(0.73) 
Rainfall shock x distance to 
weather station (miles) 
-.00196 
(2.56) 
-.00152 
(1.72) 
Forecast -.00622 
(2.71) 
.000898 
(0.30) 
Forecast x  
bad rainfall shock 
- -.00109 
(2.09) 
NREGA in place .096 
(4.50) 
.0623 
(1.76) 
NREGA x bad rainfall shock - .0929 
(1.78) 
N 387 337 
Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses. 
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